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Bill Bowring 
 
The legal significance of Potsdam: Quincy Wright versus Wilhelm Grewe 
in the pages of the American Journal of International Law 
 
Introduction 
 
The Potsdam Agreement was published as a Communiqué on 1 August 1945, 
following the conference which took place from 17 July 1945
1
. I have chosen, 
as my contribution to this collection, to focus on a scholarly exchange which 
took place in 1961–1962, that is, more than 15 years after the Agreement, in the 
context of one of the most dangerous crises of the Cold War, one of the precise 
moments at which nuclear Armageddon could have been unleashed. The prota-
gonists, in the pages of the American Journal of International Law were, at first 
sight, two distinguished jurists, both of whom had risen high in their country’s 
service: the international relations scholar Quincy Wright, who lived from 1890 
to 1970, and was 70 years old at the time, and the lawyer and diplomat Wilhelm 
Grewe, who lived from 1911 to 2000, 20 years Wright’s junior, and 51 years 
old at the time of his reply to Wright. It is immediately apparent that the Pots-
dam Agreement was very much the central matter of contention between them, 
Wright inclined to accept political realities but prepared to argue, against him-
self, for a “return to Potsdam”, and for that reason denounced by Grewe. 
I start with some brief remarks on the Cold War and the events of 1961–
62, before setting out the elements of Wright’s comments and Grewe’s heated 
response. Next, I explore the background of Wright, whose many writings on 
war in international law show him to be an irrepressible advocate of peace. 
Thirdly, I show in detail, referring to two scholars in particular, Bardo Fass-
bender and Martti Koskenniemi, Grewe’s remarkably successful careers in the 
Third Reich and, after an effortless transition, in the state service of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Was he nothing more than a highly regarded scholar and 
distinguished public servant? Fourth, therefore, I turn to Grewe’s intellectual 
position, which turns out to be a faithful reproduction of and commentary on the 
ideas of his mentor, Carl Schmitt. In his highly praised monograph, nearly 40 
years in the writing and publishing, The Epochs of International Law
2
, Grewe 
showed himself to be a thinker for whom the Third Reich was simply one con-
testing party in a normal inter-state conflict, and for whom the Holocaust and 
Hitler’s other crimes did not merit comment much less explanation. 
                                                 
1
 Text at http:/www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-ressources/truman-
potsdam/; see also Miscamble 2007. 
2
 Grewe 1988 and 2001. 
2 
 
 
The Cold War, and the events of 1961-2
3
 
 
Elizabeth Barker wrote in 1963, in the immediate aftermath of the Berlin crisis 
of 1961-62: “For the nine years between May 1949 (the end of the blockade) 
and November 1958 (the start of Mr. Khrushchev's campaign against Western 
rights in the city) there was relative calm over Berlin.”4  
This was a lengthy period in which, despite the blatant failure on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain to implement the Potsdam Agreement, the position of 
West Berlin as a Land within the FRG appeared somewhat normalised, despite 
the constant flood of GDR citizens leaving for West Berlin and the FRG, and 
the starkly anomalous position of the East, in which Berlin as “Hauptstadt der 
DDR”, Capital City of the German Democratic Republic, was only part of a city 
still subject to the Four Power Agreement.  
It must also be noted in this context that the flight from the East was as 
much, or more, about living standards as about politics. While the occupying 
forces of each of the Four Powers were highly visible in the parts of Germany 
they occupied, the FRG benefitted from the Marshall Plan, the European Re-
covery Program, ERP, in which the United States gave $13 billion (approxi-
mately $130 billion) in economic support to help rebuild Western European 
economies, especially the German economy, after the end of World War II. The 
plan was in operation for four years beginning in April 1948. At the same time 
the USSR made much greater use of disassembly of German industry under its 
control as a form of reparation. Military industries and those owned by the state, 
by Nazi party members, and by war criminals were confiscated. These indus-
tries amounted to approximately 60% of total industrial production in the Soviet 
zone. Most heavy industry (constituting 20% of total production) was claimed 
by the USSR as reparations. The reparations seriously hindered the ability of the 
GDR to compete with FRG economically
5
. 
Right up until the fall of the Berlin Wall, US, British and French service-
men in uniform had the right to enter East Berlin freely under the Four Power 
Agreement. I myself witnessed American servicemen shopping in Alex-
anderplatz, and a British regimental dinner held in the now demolished Palast 
Hotel, next to the now demolished Palast der Republik, the officers in their scar-
let uniforms. And to the shame of the DDR, it was not possible for the Natio-
nale Volksarmee (NVA, National Peoples Army) of the DDR to have its head-
quarters, the Ministry for National Defense (Ministerium für Nationale Vertei-
                                                 
3
 Gaddis 2007, pp. 112–115. 
4
 Barker 1963, p. 59. 
5
 See Heske 2009. 
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digung), in Berlin, but instead in the town of Strausberg, at the eastern end of 
the Berlin S-Bahn. In 1985 I cycled through Strausberg by accident; fortunately 
the guards in their watch-towers could not see that I was a foreigner.  
Barker sets out the crucial passages in Khrushchev’s speech of 10 November 
1958, which was indeed all about the Potsdam Agreement, and which led direct-
ly to the Berlin crisis of 1961: 
 
“What then is left of the Potsdam Agreement? One thing, in effect:  the 
so-called four-Power status of Berlin, that is, a position in which the three 
Western Powers – the United States, Britain and France – have the  pos-
sibility of lording it in West Berlin, turning that part of the city, which is 
the capital of the German Democratic Republic, into some kind  of State 
within a State and, profiting by this, conducting subversive activities from 
Western Berlin against the German Democratic Republic, against the So-
viet Union, and the other Warsaw Treaty countries.” 
 
After a series of rhetorical questions, Khrushchev said:  
 
“Is it not time for us to reconsider our attitude to this part of the  Potsdam 
Agreement, and to denounce it? . . . The time has obviously come for the 
signatories of the Potsdam Agreement to renounce the remnants of the 
occupation régime in Berlin, and thereby make it possible to create a nor-
mal situation in the capital of the German Democratic Republic. The So-
viet Union, for its part, would hand over to the sovereign German Demo-
cratic Republic the functions in Berlin that are still exercised by Soviet 
agencies.”6 
 
Barker points out Khrushchev’s serious error, entirely consistent with his ten-
dency to speak off the cuff: 
 
“It was in these terms that Mr. Khrushchev launched the Berlin crisis.  It 
is almost impossible that he could have consulted his political and legal 
experts on his phrasing, since they would have prevented him from mak-
ing the mistake of deriving Western rights in Berlin from the Potsdam 
Agreement, instead of from Germany's unconditional surrender and the 
four-Power agreements of September 1944 and May 1945.”7 
                                                 
6
 Cited in Barker 1963, pp. 60–61.  
7
 Ibidem, p. 61. 
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Another commentator, Petr Lunák, commented on Khrushchev’s miscalculation 
as to the extent that he could intimidate Kennedy, who was much younger than 
him and relatively experienced:  
 
“After Khrushchev first overestimated the willingness of President Eisen-
hower to reach a compromise, in the aftermath of the US fiasko at the 
Bay of Pigs he believed that President Kennedy would not risk a war over 
West Berlin. The Vienna summit provided Khrushchev with an oppor-
tunity to intimidate the young president and prepare the ground for uni-
lateral changes in Berlin. Thanks only to strong US policy in the summer 
of 1961 did the Soviet leader change his mind and content himself with 
halting East German immigration through the wall.”8 
 
For the record, the key events of 1961 were the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion in 
April 17–19, when a CIA-backed invasion of Cuba by counter-revolutionaries 
ended in failure. Construction of the Berlin Wall (or Anti-Fascist Defence Wall 
as it was called by the GDR) commenced on 13 August
9
. 27 October was the 
beginning of the Checkpoint Charlie standoff between US and Soviet tanks, the 
closest the two sides came to actual fighting, and on 31 October
10
 the Soviet 
Union detonated the “Tsar Bomba”, the most powerful thermonuclear weapon 
ever tested, with an explosive yield of some 50 megatons. 
A year later, on 16 October 1962 the Cuban Missile Crisis started, when 
President Kennedy ordered the naval blockade that intensified the crisis over 
Cuba and brought the US and the USSR to the brink of nuclear war. The Soviet 
leaders backed down and agreed to withdraw their nuclear missiles from Cuba, 
in exchange for a secret agreement by Kennedy pledging to withdraw similar 
American missiles from Turkey, and guaranteeing that the US would not move 
against the Castro regime. 
 
Quincy Wright’s notes in the AJIL 
 
Quincy Wright
11
 was not only a distinguished scholar, with many publications, 
but also an adviser to Justice Robert H. Jackson at the Nuremberg Trials. He 
often provided advice to the U.S. State Department. He declared as follows: 
 
“There can be little question but that East Germany is a de facto state. It 
is, therefore, the right and, according to the late Judge Lauterpacht, the 
                                                 
8
 Lunák 2003, p. 53. 
9
 Gaddis 1998, pp. 143–149, 253–255. 
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 Trauschweizer 2006. 
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duty of Russia and other states to recognize it unless it was established in 
violation of international obligations. By the Declaration of United Na-
tions of January 1, 1942, the Allies agreed not to make separate peace, 
and by the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 they provided for a united, dis-
armed, and neutralized Germany. These agreements, however, have been 
violated by all the parties, notably by the West, in recognizing the Ger-
man Federal Republic, making treaties with it, arming it, and admitting it 
to NATO. The West can hardly invoke these agreements against the So-
viet Union. The latter would seem to have as much right to recognize and 
make peace with East Germany as the West had to recognize and make 
peace with West Germany.”11 
 
His reference to a “return to the Potsdam Agreement”, seized upon by Grewe, 
was clearly not to be taken seriously as a policy prescription in the real world. 
 
“It would, therefore, appear that if West Berlin is to continue as an area of 
Western civilization, other solutions, perhaps a return to the Potsdam 
Agreement providing for a disarmed and neutralized Germany, should be 
considered. With such a solution the two Germanies would probably tend 
to come together and a united Germany would probably have a Western 
orientation. This solution, however, would mean the permanent with-
drawal of West Germany from NATO, inspected disarmament for the 
whole of Germany, and acceptance by the West of the Oder-Neisse line 
and the de facto governments of both Germanies. The idea of their union 
by free election would have to be abandoned, because obviously the So-
viet Union will not accept it, leaving it to the German governments and 
peoples to work out their future relations.”12 
 
However, Wright was in no doubt as to the correct and realistic position to be 
taken by an international lawyer: 
 
“From the point of view of international law, it would seem that the West 
cannot object to Soviet recognition of East Germany, but should enjoy 
continuous access, at least civilian, to West Berlin, which would not be-
come legally a part of East Germany. Both the West and the Soviet Union 
should follow the precepts of the United Nations Charter requiring that 
they settle their international disputes by peaceful means and refrain from 
threat or use of force (Article 2, pars. 3, 4). In accord with those precepts, 
                                                 
11
 Wright 1961, p. 960. 
12
 Ibidem, p. 964.  
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a reference of the matter to the International Court of Justice in case East 
Germany is recognized as an independent state and interferes with the 
present situation, would seem desirable. The Court would probably fol-
low its precedent in the Portuguese-Indian case, though it was careful to 
rest its opinion in that case on special agreements and customs rather than 
on general principles of international law.”13 
 
The response from Wilhelm Grewe
14
 was respectful to his distinguished senior 
interlocutor, and was in no way personal, nor did he argue ad hominem. None-
theless, his objections went to the core of Wright’s realist appreciation of the 
crisis and how to overcome it. It should of course be noted that in the aftermath 
of the Helsinki process which concluded in 1975 with the creation of the CSCE 
(Conference on security and cooperation in Europe), the GDR achieved the 
recognition it and the USSR craved, with a seat in the United Nations and state 
visits by Erich Honecker and Helmut Kohl, only to vanish just a few years lat-
er.” 
 
According to Grewe
14
, Quincy Wright had argued the following points: 
 
“(1) There is no ground for legal objection to Soviet recognition of, and 
conclusion of a treaty of peace with, East Germany. 
 
(2) The 1945 agreements have been violated by all the parties, ‘notably 
by the West’, in recognizing the German Federal Republic, making trea-
ties with it, arming it, and admitting it to NATO.”  
 
Grewe cited the passage set out above: 
 
“The West can hardly invoke these agreements against the Soviet Union. 
The latter would seem to have as much right to recognize and make peace 
with East Germany as the West had to recognize and make peace with 
West Germany.”  
 
“(3) If East Germany should be recognized as a fully sovereign state, 
West Berlin, having never been considered a part of East Germany, 
would remain an enclave within its territory.  
 
                                                 
13
 Wright 1961, p. 965. 
14
 Grewe 1962, pp. 510–511. 
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(4) Access of the Western Powers to West Berlin (‘at least civilian’) con-
stitutes a servitude which East Germany would be obliged to respect if it 
became independent. 
  
(5) Soviet responsibility in regard to access to West Berlin would end. 
The Western Powers would have to argue the case with East Germany. 
 
(6) In the long run, East Germany's interest in eliminating West Berlin's 
special status is likely to prove no less than India’s interest in eliminating 
the Portuguese enclaves. Therefore, the Western Powers will have diffi-
culty in maintaining their rights. Other solutions, ‘perhaps a return to the 
Potsdam Agreement providing for a disarmed and neutralized Germany, 
should be considered’.” 
 
I cited Wright at some length, above, in order to show that Grewe had deliber-
ately misrepresented him, for the purposes of his polemic. 
  
Grewe replied point by point, to Wright’s argument as he had recon-
structed it:
15
 
 
1) East Germany is not a de facto state, recognition of which is permissi-
ble … Up to now, there is no government outside the Sino-Soviet bloc 
which recognizes East Germany as a de facto state. If it is not a de facto 
state, recognition is not permissible, but is at the least premature. Such 
premature recognition constitutes an illegal intervention. 
 
2) Being an international lawyer as well as an official representative of 
the West German Government, I deeply regret the inability of an out-
standing American colleague to see any legal difference between West 
Germany and East Germany as far as recognition is concerned. Nobody 
doubts that West Germany is a de facto state. Even the Soviet Union does 
not dispute this fact. There are few who doubt that it is also a de jure 
state. Many nations even recognize West Germany as the only govern-
ment legitimately entitled to speak for the German people as a whole. 
As to the Four-Power Agreements of 1945 (the Berlin Declarations 
of June 5, 1945, and the Potsdam Agreement), there can be no doubt that 
it was the Soviet side which sabotaged and destroyed the arrangements 
for a joint occupation, and began to arm the East German Communists. 
When negotiations on the rearmament of West Germany started in May, 
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 Ibidem, pp. 511–513.  
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1951, there was already a large military force of the East German regime 
in existence. It was not labeled an ‘army’, but a Kasernierte Volkspolizei 
(garrisoned people’s police); but once again: Is it the formal label which 
counts exclusively in international law? 
 
3) If East Germany were to be recognized as a sovereign state, West Ber-
lin would remain an ‘enclave’. But whose territory would this enclave be? 
The Supreme Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic, in accordance 
with the Basic Law of the Federal Republic and the Constitution of West 
Berlin, considers Berlin a Land (state) of the Federal Republic, its consti-
tutional right as a land being suspended by virtue of occupation law. 
 
4) The presence of the Western forces in Berlin rests on the right of bel-
ligerent occupation (neither ‘conquest’ nor ‘surrender’, viz., the capitula-
tion of the German High Command is a correct definition of the legal ba-
sis for the Western position in Berlin). Free access of the occupation 
forces is an integral part of those rights. As the occupying Power is re-
sponsible for law and order and the restoration of public life in the occu-
pied territory, the right of free civilian access derives from this obligation 
to protect some basic rights of the civilian population. What title has Mr. 
Wright in mind, which he seems to regard as legally better founded ? 
 
5) The Soviet Union is not bound to stay indefinitely as an occupying 
Power. Without any doubt, it cannot be prevented from terminating its 
occupation in Berlin and Germany and from withdrawing its forces, per-
mitting the Germans to form a government of their own. But this is not 
what the Soviet Union is going to do. It wants to retain its forces in East 
Germany and around Berlin, supporting a Communist puppet government 
which is clearly prepared to grant treaty rights for the stationing of Soviet 
forces. 
Again the question arises, whether international law is bound to ac-
cept every faked pretext at face value. I believe it is not, and it is a sound 
legal position to hold the Soviet Union responsible as long as they actual-
ly exercise occupation functions, whatever may be the label they use. 
 
6) ‘Return to the Potsdam Agreement’ is a fantastic suggestion. First of 
all, Potsdam provided for a ‘disarmed’, but not for a ‘neutralized’ Ger-
many. Second, it provided for a type of Four-Power control machinery 
which turned out to be a tragic illusion. Third, its most deplorable defect 
was the absence of any clear decision on the political future of Germany. 
It is difficult to understand how the Potsdam policy, which caused the di-
9 
 
vision of Germany, should now, 17 years later, by virtue of a strange mir-
acle, lead to a solution whereby ‘the two Germanies would probably tend 
to come together and a united Germany would probably have a Western 
orientation’. For many years ‘Return to Potsdam’ has been a declared aim 
of Soviet policy.”16 
 
It will be noted that this last remark comes very close to identifying Wright as a 
witting or unwitting agent of, or at least apologist for, Soviet policy. I therefore 
turn next to introducing Quincy Wright. 
 
Who was Quincy Wright? 
 
Emily Griggs wrote:  
 
“Quincy Wright, a scholar of international relations at the University of 
Chicago, is often singled out as an exemplar of the unsophisticated ideal-
ism and lack of theoretical rigor that marked scholarship in international 
relations before World War II. Like the rest of his generation, or so the 
story goes, he recoiled from the realities of power politics until interna-
tional events proved such attitudes imprudent; he continued to believe 
that increasing economic interdependence and improved international law 
and organization would preserve international stability … Quincy 
Wright’s ideas about international politics between the wars were more 
practical, sophisticated and complex than existing interpretations allow.” 
 
The abstract to her article reads:  
 
“Contrary to conventional belief, IR theorist Quincy Wright and his co-
hort before World War II were neither idealists, legalists, nor moralists. 
Deeply grounded in the realism and pragmatism that marked the Univer-
sity of Chicago's interwar climate, Wright applied an ethically neutral and 
empirical approach to understanding international relations. He recog-
nized that a struggle for power drove international politics and would 
continue to do so for the foreseeable future.”17  
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 Grewe 1962, p. 513. 
17
 Griggs 2001, p. 71. 
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 Richard Falk, a distinguished product of the “New Haven” “policy-oriented” 
school of international legal scholarship
18
, and very much a progressive in in-
ternational law, commented: 
 
“Quincy Wright’s central concern during his long and remarkably pro-
ductive life was with the status of war in human affairs. As a scholar he 
studied the subject ceaselessly, and from many angles. As a human being 
he worked with steadfast effort to promote a peaceful world. In these 
multiple roles as scholar/activist/humanitarian Quincy Wright placed 
great stress on the importance of international law, and he wrote often 
and influentially on the relevance of law to war. One exemplary feature 
of Quincy Wright’s achievements as man and scholar involved his ex-
traordinary capacity to separate realms of scholarly analysis from realms 
of emotional commitment and fortuitous affiliation. In his legal analysis, 
Quincy Wright embodied the spirit of science, relying upon impartial in-
quiry into rules and facts so as to produce ‘the right answer’.”19 
 
I have found no evidence to the contrary. 
 
Wilhelm Grewe 
 
In this section I have drawn substantially from Bardo Fassbender’s comprehen-
sive 2002 article
20
. At the time of his rather acerbic response to Quincy Wright, 
Grewe was the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United 
States of America, having enjoyed a brilliant career after WWII. Following the 
creation of the FRG in 1949 he was one of the small circle of lawyers advising 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in matters of foreign policy and relations with the 
three Western Allied Powers. From 1951 to 1955, he headed the German dele-
gation negotiating the ending of the Allied occupation of West Germany, and 
helped to draft the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the 
Federal Republic of Germany of 1954 (Generalvertrag or Deutschlandvertrag), 
which gave the FRG ‘the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal and 
external affairs’ (Article 1), on condition that it was integrated into the Western 
defence alliance
21
. From 1953 to 1954 he was acting head of the legal depart-
ment of the West German Foreign Office, and from 1955 to 1958 was head of 
the political department.  
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 Hathaway 2007.  
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 Falk 1972, p. 560. 
20
 Fassbender 2002. 
21
 Ibidem, p. 482.   
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In 1954 and 1955, he headed the German observer delegation at the Four Pow-
ers conferences in Berlin and Geneva. In 1955, he drew up the policy according 
to which the FRG, as “the only legitimate representative of Germany and the 
German people”, would break off diplomatic relations with any state recogniz-
ing East Germany. This policy, which became known as the ‘Hallstein Doc-
trine’ (at the time Walter Hallstein was Secretary of State at the FRG Foreign 
Office), remained in force until 1969
22
. 
But Grewe is best known as the author of Epochen der Völkerrechtsge-
schichte
23
, translated into English as Epochs of International Law.
24
  Fassbender 
informs us that the first manuscript of the Epochen was completed in late 
1944
25
, in the last months of WWII, when the book could not, for obvious rea-
sons, be printed. Grewe turned to this text after retiring from the diplomatic ser-
vice. He revised and expanded the content, taking into consideration the litera-
ture that had been published since the 1940s; he continued the account beyond 
the year 1939 (where the original text had ended), and added a new chapter 
dealing with the period since 1945 under the title “United Nations: International 
Law in the Age of American-Soviet Rivalry and the Rise of the Third World”. 
In this form, the book was published in 1984 by Nomos in Baden-Baden. A 
second, unchanged edition came out in 1988. 
Grewe was not the only German scholar working in the last months of 
WWII. Martti Koskenniemi points out
26
: 
  
“Another way of composing histories of international law is exemplified 
by the German jurists Carl Schmitt and Wilhelm Grewe, both writing 
while the bombs were falling over Berlin during the end-phase of the 
Second World War. Schmitt’s legal realism and his late view of law as 
part of ‘concrete order thinking’ are today well-known and have inspired 
his search for legal orders determined by a powerful centre radiating its 
influence across the world.
27
 Similar ideas inspired Grewe’s The Epochs 
of International Law, published in English in 2000, the most widely used 
textbook of international legal history today.” 
 
Indeed, Fassbender argues that “the book’s principal idea – an interpretation of 
the history of international law as a sequence of particular epochs defined in 
each case by the then-dominant power in the system of states – was developed 
                                                 
22
 Ibidem, p. 483. 
23
 Grewe 1988. 
24
 Grewe 2001.  
25
 Fassbender 2002, p. 482. 
26
 Koskenniemi 2013, p. 219. 
27
 Schmitt 1950.  
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in the context of National Socialist political and legal thought, and was influ-
enced in particular by the work of Carl Schmitt …”28. Martti Koskenniemi also 
observed that “Schmitt’s voice is clearly audible in such German post-war his-
tories of international law as those by Grewe and Ziegler.”29 In the footnote he 
added: “In 1948, Schmitt held Grewe to be the ‘foremost German international 
lawyer’.”30 In Koskenniemi’s view, Schmitt’s standpoint was a  
 
“political theology that is structurally homologous to Christian monothe-
ism, historically continuous with religious teaching, and, above all, 
equipped by a supplement of faith that decides who is the enemy – ‘one’s 
own question as the figure’ – in a concrete situation31…. to move com-
pletely away from a philosophical-naturalist frame to a theological one, to 
interpret the present in light of a Christian conception of history.”32 
 
Liliana Obregón claims, on the contrary, that “Grewe denounced Schmitt’s 
work as bad history, ‘not in conformity with the historical facts and … uncon-
firmed by the literature of the period’.”33 However, it is worth citing in full the 
paragraph from which these words are drawn. 
 
“The broadening and transformation of the international legal order did 
not begin toward the end of the century, as Carl Schmitt asserted in his 
far reaching interpretation of the modern development of international 
law. Schmitt’s other objection to the traditional view of the development 
of international law in the nineteenth century, that the territoriality-
restricted European order presented by the ius publicum europaeum did 
not dissolve until as late as 1890 and was only then replaced by a global 
‘international law’, is not in conformity with the historical facts and is 
similarly unconfirmed by the literature of the period.”34 
 
Which, for whatever reason, is not quite how Obregón presents it. Fassbender 
and Koskenniemi would seem to have the better interpretation of Grewe’s debt 
to Schmitt. 
So, who was Grewe before WWII? 
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 Fassbender 2002, p. 480. 
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 Koskenniemi 2004, p. 494. 
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 Schmitt 1995, p. 203. 
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 Koskenniemi 2004, p. 499. 
32
 Ibidem, p. 501. 
33
 Obregón 2014, p. 933. In this chapter she devotes several pages, 928–930, to Schmitt. 
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 Grewe 200, p. 466–467. 
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According to Frowein (not confirmed elsewhere), Grewe joined the Nazi 
Party (NSDAP) in 1933
35
. Fassbender relates
36
 that having studied law at the 
universities of Hamburg, Berlin, Freiburg and Frankfurt (1930–1934), Grewe 
became an assistant to Professor Ernst Forsthoff at the University of Hamburg. 
Grewe then followed Forsthoff to the University of Königsberg in East Prussia 
(1936–1937). In 1937, he joined the Deutsches Institut für Außenpolitische For-
schung (the German Institute for Foreign Policy Research) in Berlin, an institu-
tion controlled by the Nazi politician Joachim von Ribbentrop who became 
German Foreign Minister in 1938. The Institute was headed by Professor Fritz 
(Friedrich) Berber, and was mainly engaged in propaganda in support of Hit-
ler’s foreign policy. After 1939, it was closely associated with the Deutsche In-
formationsstelle (German Office for Information), a propaganda institution 
working for the Foreign Office and also headed by Berber. Hermann Weber 
claims that, before joining the Institute, Grewe had worked in the Dienststelle 
Ribbentrop, an office established in 1934 in Berlin by Ribbentrop to support his 
foreign policy initiatives
37
. 
Grewe was responsible for the Institute’s international law section and for 
the regular international law report appearing in the journal of the Institute. The 
Institute readily and continuously supported the National Socialist policy of 
conquest. In the main, it appears, its publications abstained from using anti-
Jewish or racist language. Overt anti-semitism is not to be found in Grewe’s 
writings, either. 
In 1939, Grewe became lecturer (Dozent) at the Hochschule für Politik 
(School of Political Science) in Berlin, where Berber had been teaching since 
1930. In 1940, the institution was integrated into the newly founded Auslands-
wissenschaftliche Fakultät (Faculty of Foreign Studies) of the University of 
Berlin, where Grewe was appointed lecturer (Lehrbeauftragter) for the subject 
‘Legal Foundations of Foreign Policy’. After the Faculty of Law in Königsberg 
had accepted, in March 1941, parts of what was later to become Grewe’s book, 
Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte, as his Habilitationsschrift, Grewe was ap-
pointed Dozent at the Faculty of Foreign Studies and, simultaneously, at the 
Law Faculty of the University of Berlin. A year later, at the age of 31, he be-
came extraordinary professor (außerordentlicher Professor) at the Faculty of 
Foreign Studies in Berlin, teaching the subjects ‘Legal Foundations of Foreign 
Policy’ and ‘Policy of International Law’ (Völkerrechtspolitik). It is reported 
that efforts made in 1943–1944 to set up a chair for Grewe in Berlin failed be-
cause of his marriage to Marianne Partsch, whose grandfather was Jewish. 
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When in 1946 the University of Berlin was reopened in the Soviet sector of the 
city, the Auslandswissenschaftliche Fakultät was quietly dissolved. After an in-
terruption of only a few months in the summer of 1945, Grewe continued his 
university career, first in Göttingen (1945–1947) and then in Freiburg im Breis-
gau (from 1947)
38
. 
 
Grewe’s apologia for Nazi policy and blindness to the Holocaust 
 
Martti Koskenniemi has provided a close reading and critique of The Epochs of 
International Law
39
. His primary contention is as follows: 
 
“Above all, however, Grewe's account of international law's ‘epochs’, 
each dominated by a single power whose ideas and concepts prevailed 
over those of its rivals and which was able to use law to confer ‘general 
and absolute validity on its national expansionist ideology’ (p. 23), was 
the unmistakable analogon of Carl Schmitt's Grossraumlehre, first de-
clared in a famous lecture in Kiel in April 1939. In fact, the book reads 
almost like a commentary, or expansion, of Schmitt’s Der Nomos der 
Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum and never more so 
than in its description of the turn from the British predominance in the 
nineteenth century to the ‘Anglo-American Condominium’ in the inter-
war period, marked by a commercial universalism (‘the invasion of poli-
tics by economic powers’, 591), the use of the League of Nations to fur-
ther British and American interests, the description of the modem State in 
terms of what Schmitt used to call ‘total State out of weakness’ – the ex-
pansion of the State into ‘the organising principle of society’ (Grewe re-
fers to Schmitt’s notorious Der Hüter der Verfassung of 1931, p. 589) –
and especially the turn to a morally loaded ‘discriminatory concept of 
war’40. 
Koskenniemi is especially concerned by Grewe’s blindness to the Holocaust: 
 
“The fact that there is no mention of Germany’s destruction of European 
Jewry during the Second World War, and that one gets no understanding 
of the Nuremberg process (beyond the suggestion of its having been ‘vic-
tors’ justice’) may be charitably credited to Grewe’s ultra-realistic meth-
od. Every aspect of international history is for Grewe a reflection of 
struggle for power and prestige, and political and legal doctrines never 
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more than academic superstructures or ideological facades. Nobody starts 
wars; they just ‘break out’. But when every politics is essentially the 
same, the categories of right and wrong, or good and bad, become mean-
ingless, and (for example) Hitler’s policy is just one among ‘several in-
compatible intervention claims’ (595). When such cold realism is applied 
to the catastrophes of the 20th century, with all sides portrayed as essen-
tially ‘similar’, the result is a perverse exculpation of the German atroci-
ties, a continued violation upon wounded communities, a crime of forget-
ting”.41 
 
As Koskenniemi points out, even the Second World War disappears – and the 
following passage dissected by Koskenniemi continued through several revi-
sions into the final Nomos edition: 
 
“In a curiously revealing slip of the pen Grewe writes of the ‘Internation-
al Legal Order of the Interwar Period 1919–1944’ as if the period’s last 
five years would not have been years of ‘war’ at all! For the fact is that 
the Second World War is practically non-existent in this book of 725 
pages. There is just the Versailles League, a series of imperial ‘policies’, 
and then suddenly the United Nations, as the ‘Anglo-American Condo-
minium’ turns into the Cold War. The killing of six million Jews and the 
annihilation of the Gypsy communities as part of a deliberate German 
policy, or even the ‘conventional’ war crime of the murder of three mil-
lion Russian prisoners of war, receive no mention, not even euphemisti-
cally.” 
 
It is a matter of surprise and shock to me that so many of my colleagues refer to 
Grewe, and to Schmitt, as eminent scholars whose work is to be cited with ap-
proval, and without any contextualisation or comment. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The scholarly exchange which is the subject-matter of this contribution to the 
Anniversary of the Potsdam Agreement does not contain an analysis of the 
Agreement itself. Nor have I attempted to provide one. There is no dispute as to 
the fact that what the victorious powers agreed in 1945 did not come to pass. 
History turned out, as usual, rather differently.  
Instead, I have used this exchange, in which the Potsdam Agreement was 
an essential and central topic, to throw light on the reasons for the sharp ani-
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mosity shown by Wilhelm Grewe to the very idea of the Agreement, or, come to 
that, the de facto existence and right to recognition of the GDR. Grewe was not 
at all the only scholar to emerge unscathed from a history of conformity, ac-
commodation, and approval for the Third Reich and the Nazi regime, and to be 
completely acceptable to the new elite of the Federal Republic of Germany. His 
extraordinary analysis and conclusion in his magnum opus were in fact the basis 
not only for much scholarship in the FRG, but also for its political and diplo-
matic stance at the highest levels. 
Together with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Kohl was able 
to resolve talks with the former Allies of World War II to allow German reuni-
fication. Over the objections of Bundesbank president Karl Otto Pöhl, he al-
lowed a 1:1 exchange rate for wages, interest and rent between the West and 
East Marks. In the end, this policy would lead to the strangulation of enterprises 
in the new federal states. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, whose construc-
tion was the background for the exchange explored in this contribution, in 1989, 
a reunification treaty was signed on 31 August 1990, and was overwhelmingly 
approved by both parliaments, FRG and GDR, on 20 September 1990. On 3 Oc-
tober 1990, the GDR officially ceased to exist. In my own lifetime Czechoslo-
vakia, Yugoslavia and the USSR have all vanished. There can be no “return to 
Potsdam”, even as a fantasy. 
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